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Abstract: The theories of collective action relating to natural resource man-
agement and agricultural development are often considered to be polarized. The 
theories are divided into institutional economics with a focus on social dilemmas 
and sociology/anthropology. This article reviews the attempts to find common 
ground between the two groups. Several studies in sociology and anthropology 
have pointed out weaknesses in the approaches based on institutional econom-
ics. However, the criticisms have failed to trigger serious debate. Studies in each 
group have taken the initiative to “reach out” to the other, but so far the results 
have been limited. This article proposes an alternative approach to finding com-
mon ground between both groups. This involves focusing on the scales of valid-
ity of the research, i.e. the scale at which research results are considered valid. 
Many studies use or develop theoretical bases and build methodologies in order 
to obtain results that are deemed to be valid at a local or global scale. Other 
approaches use a meso-validity scale, e.g. one economic sector or one type of 
natural resource in a specific region. Some of these approaches organize a struc-
tured comparison between different cases of collective action and, at the same 
time, address the criticisms made by sociologists and anthropologists with regard 
to the approaches used in institutional economics. Research at a meso-validity 
scale can help establish common ground between the two main groups of theories 
concerned by collective action.
Keywords: Anthropology, collective action, institutional economics, sociology, 
theoretical basis, validity scale
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1. Introduction
In the past 30 years, there has been growing interest in the study of collective 
action initiated by actors in rural areas. This applies to both natural resource 
management and to the coordination of agricultural production and marketing 
(Bernard et al. 2008; Poteete et al. 2009). Studies have developed or mobilized 
diverse theoretical bases, including frameworks (the elements investigated and 
the relationship between them), theories (that specify which elements are particu-
larly relevant and which may be used to make general assumptions), and models 
(that make precise assumptions about specific variables) (Ostrom 2011). The dif-
ferent studies include a relatively homogenous group of research in institutional 
economics, with key contributions by authors, such as Ostrom (1990), Baland and 
Platteau (1996) or Agrawal (2002). These studies generally share similar goals, 
assumptions and a specific viewpoint for the analysis of case studies. They also 
obtain similar results in terms of identifying conditions for successful collective 
action. A further group of studies of collective action, involving actors in rural 
areas, has been conducted from a sociological or anthropological perspective. 
These studies use very diverse theoretical bases, for example, political ecology 
(Campbell 2007; Dahal et al. 2014) or actor-network theory (Steins 1999; Van Der 
Kooij et al. 2015). Studies in sociology and anthropology do not generally pro-
pose standard methods to analyze cases of collective action because they consider 
that methods should be specifically adapted to each case.
Both groups of theories have advantages. The theoretical bases used in insti-
tutional economics have proven their capacity to structure a comparison between 
different cases. In fact, they have been used widely in the academic community.1
 
This success is largely due to the fact that the theoretical bases proposed by this 
group of studies are universal (applicable to a wide variety of situations). They 
also set out clear methodological guidelines for studying examples of collective 
action, which means that they are easy to apply. Studies in anthropology and 
sociology have proven their capacity to provide a detailed understanding of the 
multiple dimensions of collective action in specific case studies (e.g. Dominguez 
and Benessaiah 2017). Moreover, studies of collective action in both institutional 
economics (Rap 2006) and sociology/anthropology (Suhardiman and Mollinga 
2012) have influenced policies for natural resource management.
There are clear differences within each group of theories. However, these 
are minor compared to the large divide that appears to separate the two groups. 
Despite major differences in theoretical orientations, is it possible to find some 
common ground between the two groups? By common ground, we mean the pos-
sibility to identify sets of approaches, which are considered valid according to the 
criteria of validity as defined in theoretical bases drawn from both groups of theo-
ries. In other words, is it possible to set up approaches that can benefit from the 
1
 For instance, in March 2017, Google Scholar research engine identified more than 27,000 aca-
demic references quoting Ostrom (1990).
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main advantages of the two groups? In particular, is it possible to design research 
approaches that: (i) make assertions that are considered valid in a large number of 
situations on the basis of a structured comparison of case studies, (ii) take account 
of the multiple dimensions of collective action? If common ground is established, 
it could provide the starting point for genuine dialogue with regard to theoretical 
bases, methods and results, which is not simply a matter of one group occasion-
ally borrowing some framework or concept from another group.
This article reviews the attempts that have been made to establish common ground 
between the two groups of theories and goes on to propose an alternative approach to 
finding common ground. The following section presents the main characteristics of 
each group of theories. The next section reviews the efforts to encourage debate. It 
also considers the attempts made by researchers from each group to include propos-
als put forward by the other group. We demonstrate that most initiatives have failed 
to achieve common ground. As a way forward, we suggest that validity scales should 
be taken into account in research on collective action. We define the validity scale as 
the level at which research findings are expected to be valid. Most research on collec-
tive action has been designed to achieve either a global validity scale (i.e. where the 
theoretical bases and results are considered relevant in any case of collective action) 
or a local validity scale (i.e. where methodology is defined on a case-by-case basis and 
does not allow for the structured comparison of cases). Other research on collective 
action has been conducted with a meso-validity scale, which concerns, for instance, a 
single economic sector or a specific natural resource in a particular region. We argue 
that if certain conditions are met, the use of a meso-validity scale could lead to the 
successful establishment of common ground between the two groups of studies of 
collective action in rural areas. 
2. Two main groups of theories for studying collective action
2.1. Institutional economics
This group of studies can be characterized by the following three elements, in 
terms of their goals and theoretical bases. First, this group focuses on how the 
actors’ collective action is conducted to examine how actors find solutions collec-
tively in a situation involving a social dilemma, i.e. when coordination between 
actors can generate greater benefits, for each actor overall, than if actors adopt 
individual strategies (Poteete et al. 2009). The most famous social dilemma is 
the one that occurs when the use of a common-pool natural resource may lead 
to a “tragedy of the commons”. These studies aim to identify the factors which 
influence the actors’ capacities to cooperate and, in particular, their capacity to 
set up institutions which are understood as “rules in use” (Ostrom 1990). Second, 
these studies are based on methodological individualism, whereby actors act in 
a rational way according to preferences that existed before the institutions were 
created (Vatn 2007). Third, they use frameworks and models to structure the com-
parison between different cases of collective action (Poteete et al. 2009) and to 
obtain synthetic findings, especially in terms of the correlation between explana-
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tory and explained variables (Cox 2014). There are two types of correlations: 
first, the correlations that are identified between certain characteristics of actors 
and natural resources (or technical systems) on the one hand, and the types of 
institution created on the other. Second, correlations can also be made between the 
characteristics of actors, natural resources and institutions, on the one hand, and 
the effectiveness of collective actions in terms of solving a social dilemma on the 
other (Ostrom 2000; Agrawal 2001; Baggio et al. 2016). The Institutional Analysis 
and Development framework proposes a generic setting that links the different 
variables involved in the second category of correlations (Ostrom 2011). These 
commonalities allow us to consider that the authors who adopt these approaches 
belong to the same school of thought, which we refer to as the “institutional eco-
nomics approach to social dilemmas” (IESD). 
The IESD school has made a major contribution to the research in institutional 
economics that studies collective action for natural resource management. There 
are other approaches in institutional economics, e.g. that rely on classical institu-
tional economics (Marangos 2009). Moreover, some researchers from the IESD 
group also claim to have links with other research traditions. For instance, Ostrom 
(2010) also described herself as a political analyst.
In terms of results, IESD studies have identified factors that may enhance or 
weaken the success of collective action (Agrawal 2001). For instance, in the case 
of collective action for natural resource management, they state that it is easier 
to design management rules for a natural resource when its characteristics are 
known and its evolution is predictable. Actors with a low discount rate for the 
future are usually more inclined to become involved in natural resource manage-
ment than actors with a high discount rate (Ostrom 2000). Models have been 
built to propose causal linkages between several of these factors (Araral 2014). 
Ostrom (1990) identified principles for designing rules that support a successful 
and sustained user-based approach for managing common-pool natural resources. 
However, these studies have generated contradictory results with regard to the 
influence of various characteristics of the socio-ecological system on collective 
action, for instance, the heterogeneity of the users of a natural resource (Faysse 
2005; Andersson and Agrawal 2011). 
IESD studies (Ostrom 2011) present assertions about the factors that strengthen 
or weaken actors’ capacities for collective action in such a way that they some-
times lead to relatively direct recommendations for policy design. For instance, 
Shivakoti and Ostrom (2002) showed that farmer-managed irrigation schemes 
were performing better than state-managed schemes in Nepal. On the basis of this 
finding, they recommended the creation and empowerment of water user associa-
tions in state-managed irrigation schemes.
2.2. Sociology and anthropology
Numerous studies in sociology and anthropology examine collective actions initi-
ated by actors involved in natural resource management and agricultural produc-
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tion. The studies are extremely diverse in terms of the subjects, theoretical bases, 
goals, and methodologies. The different approaches clearly reflect more than one 
school of thought. Despite clear differences, these studies generally use a social 
constructivist approach with regard to: how actors perceive the issues that make 
them interdependent (as well as the opportunity and relevance of possible col-
lective actions); and how actors evaluate the performance of collective action. 
Contrary to IESD studies, some studies in sociology and anthropology do not 
consider actors’ viewpoints and preferences as a given. Instead, they explain how 
viewpoints and preferences can evolve through social interactions (Steins and 
Edwards 1999a). In sociology and anthropology, studies generally analyze the 
multiple arenas where actors interact. For instance, Aubriot and Prabhakar (2011) 
describe the interrelations between local politics and the community-based user 
organization for managing a natural resource. 
In general, these studies analyze a limited number of cases and seek to under-
stand more localized multi-dimensional aspects of social interactions between the 
actors involved in collective action. They focus on the specificities of each case. 
Numerous studies do not compare cases (e.g. Wutich 2009), which is paradoxi-
cal given that anthropology usually defines itself as a comparative social science 
(Handler 2009). 
The main findings that emerge from anthropology and sociology research and 
that have validity, which goes beyond the cases studied, concern the elements 
that should be considered when undertaking analyses of collective action. These 
include: power relationships, the degree to which collective action for natural 
resource management or agricultural development is embedded in wider social 
relations, actors and factors that are external to local communities, the hetero-
geneousness of local communities (and the importance of including certain con-
cepts, like community), historical processes, representations and discourses, etc. 
(Mosse 1997; Murray Li 2007; Fernández-Llamazares et al. 2016). One case is 
sufficient to prove that a specific concept can be important for the study of col-
lective action (e.g. religious beliefs, Dominguez et al. 2010). Other studies have 
proposed analytical concepts of broad relevance for studying collective action 
(e.g. institutional bricolage, Cleaver 2012). 
Some studies make assertions about the meaning, process, and outcomes of 
actors’ collective actions. Some consider that their results are most relevant at the 
scale considered in the case studies (Fernández-Llamazares et al. 2016). While oth-
ers propose scaling up the results from several cases to the region where the study 
took place (Genin and Simenel 2011). However, when works in sociology and 
anthropology do not include a structured comparison of several cases within a larger 
group of cases of collective action (for instance in a specific region or for specific 
natural resources), it can be difficult to present findings that can be considered as 
valid beyond the cases studied. For instance, Dahal et al. (2014) revealed the major 
power asymmetries in committees involved in managing a conservation area in a 
village in Nepal. A study of this kind does not suffice per se for making the assertion 
that similar power asymmetries occur in all committees of this type in Nepal. 
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Given the characteristics of the theoretical bases and research designs used by 
studies in sociology and anthropology, fewer assertions have been made regard-
ing the factors that could strengthen or weaken collective action compared to the 
IESD school. Some studies in sociology and anthropology nevertheless propose 
ways to improve coordination and negotiation between actors, either by empow-
ering marginalized actors (Dahal et al. 2014) or by establishing multi-stakeholder 
platforms (Steins and Edwards 1999b).
3. Attempts to link both groups of theories 
3.1. Failed attempts at discussion since the 1990s
Since the mid-1990s, scholars who adopt sociology or anthropology approaches 
have published numerous articles that point out the shortcomings of the IESD 
approaches in terms of their theoretical bases, goals, assumptions, and meth-
ods. Mosse (1997) and Steins and Edwards (1999a) were particularly convinc-
ing because they showed that undertaking a (short-sighted) analysis, based on 
IESD theories, would lead to a misunderstanding of what actually occurs in the 
examples they studied.
Mosse (1997) studied the collective management of irrigation tanks in India. 
He showed that if IESD’s theoretical bases were applied, they would cause a 
major misunderstanding of the differences observed in the collective manage-
ment of water tanks in a group of villages. The IESD approach would lead to 
a conclusion suggesting that soil characteristics were the key reason for the 
differences observed. An analysis based on this approach would claim that the 
soil characteristics made irrigation necessary in some villages and, thus, moti-
vated farmers to engage in collective action to manage the irrigation tanks. By 
contrast, in other villages where the soil characteristics meant that irrigation 
was less important, farmers had less incentive to engage in collective action. 
However, Mosse (1997) showed that in villages with a low level of collective 
action, tanks had previously been managed collectively. The soil characteris-
tics actually made it possible for some of the farmers in these villages to stop 
using tank irrigation water because they considered that the tanks were poorly 
managed. Mosse concluded that common-pool resources are not only physical 
resources, but also symbolic ones. They constitute an important locus for social 
and power relations.
Similarly, Steins and Edwards (1999a) analyzed a fishing cooperative in 
Ireland. The cooperative was inactive, despite meeting all Ostrom’s (1990) princi-
ples for the sustained user-based management of common-pool resources. Steins 
and Edwards (1999a) showed that the cooperative members did not create the 
cooperative with a view to achieving its officially stated goal, namely, to develop 
joint economic activities in a bay. Instead, they were motivated by a hidden objec-
tive, which was to assert their rights in the bay. In the light of this analysis, Steins 
and Edwards argue that a social constructivist approach is required to study col-
lective action. 
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Generally speaking, many sociologists and anthropologists consider that stud-
ies from the IESD school are based on a relatively functionalist and utilitarian 
approach to common-pool resources. They claim that IESD analyses focus exclu-
sively on the questions of “incentives” in order to understand how and why actors 
manage to solve social dilemmas (Hall et al. 2014). In addition, sociologists and 
anthropologists generally consider that the IESD school uses an oversimplified 
model to explain the relationship between actors and between actors and nat-
ural resources (Mosse 1997). In particular, they criticize the gap they perceive 
between: (1) the research findings in sociology and anthropology, in terms of the 
key elements that should be considered in a case study of collective action (as 
mentioned above); and (2) the elements that the IESD school includes in its theo-
retical bases. The following list presents the main criticisms and shows, for some 
of them, how the IESD theoretical bases have evolved in a way that answers these 
criticisms to some extent:
•	 Multiple issues and social embeddedness. The theoretical bases used by 
the IESD school generally consider that actors involved in a socio-ecolog-
ical or socio-technical system interact around a single issue (e.g. a social 
dilemma concerning the sustainable use of a common-pool resource). 
However, in practice, actors’ interaction is usually linked to several issues, 
in distinct but interrelated arenas. For example, actors involved in natural 
resource management may also be involved in local politics and there may 
be possible competition between different families or groups, etc. (Steins 
and Edwards 1999a).
•	 Multiple values, objectives and definitions of performance. In general, 
the IESD’s theoretical bases assume that actors’ behavior is driven by 
economic rationality. For instance, they consider that users of a natural 
resource aim to benefit as much as possible from using that resource 
(Nightingale 2011). Sociologists and anthropologists consider that 
IESD approaches give little or no attention to the cultural and symboli-
cal values, which users attach to common-pool resources (Mosse 1997), 
despite the importance that these values may have when it comes to 
defining the users’ identities (Gerkey 2011). Moreover, according to the 
IESD school, collective action involves coordination among actors with 
a view to solving a social dilemma. This entails the use of a universal 
definition of the performance of collective action, which is evaluated 
according to its capacity to solve a given dilemma. However, actors gen-
erally have many different objectives and, therefore, how they define the 
performance of collective action is likely to differ (Steins and Edwards 
1999a).
•	 External actors and factors. Initial works in IESD, such as Ostrom (1990), 
focused on the management of local common-pool resources. Initially, 
limited attention was given to actors and factors external to the local com-
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munities (Agrawal 2002; Ojha et al. 2016). However, IESD approaches 
have evolved. Later studies integrated external actors (Lopez-Gunn and 
Martinez-Cortina 2006). Some broadened their scope (in terms of scale) 
(Villamayor-Tomas et al. 2014) or focused on global commons (Stern 
2011).
•	 Power relationships. The IESD theoretical bases focus predominantly on 
the rules and characteristics of the socio-ecological or socio-technical sys-
tems, but tend to sideline issues of power relationships (Mosse 1997).
•	 History and processes. According to Mosse (1997) and Johnson (2004), 
the IESD theoretical bases give limited importance to the dynamics of 
socio-ecological systems. Studies using these theoretical bases have been 
accused of providing “snapshots” of management regimes (Steins 1999). 
However, Ostrom has attributed greater importance to the evolution of 
institutions in her last works (e.g. Ostrom 2014).
These criticisms have been repeated time and again (see Hall et al. 2014 for a 
recent overview), but have failed to trigger real debate. Key authors from the IESD 
school have barely responded to the criticisms, leaving sociologists and anthro-
pologists with nothing but “imaginary conversations” (Mosse 2006). In particular, 
Ostrom never quoted Mosse’s article (1997). She referred to Steins and Edwards 
(1999a) and their criticism that her work was based on an “overgeneralization 
to a broad range of cases, abstracting excessively from [the] local context and 
[the] history of particular cases” (Ostrom and Cox 2010). However, Ostrom never 
published a detailed response to the criticisms expressed by Steins and Edwards 
or other sociologists/anthropologists for that matter. Similarly, Agrawal (2001), 
whose approach can also be placed within the IESD school, briefly mentioned 
Mosse (1997) and Steins and Edwards (1999a), without responding directly to 
their criticisms.
In general, authors from the IESD school have shown a positive appreciation 
of the in-depth studies conducted by sociologists and anthropologists. However, 
they criticize the latter for generalizing on the basis of a very small set of case 
studies. They also claim that there is no guarantee with regard to case study selec-
tion bias or representativeness (in terms of the diversity of situations) (Agrawal 
2001; Poteete et al. 2009).
3.2. “Reaching out” 
Academics from each group have conducted numerous studies, which borrow 
elements (framework, concepts, etc.) from the other group. Firstly, some stud-
ies remained firmly anchored in sociology or anthropology. They followed the 
proposal made by Steins and Edwards (1999a), namely: to use key elements 
and results from IESD studies (e.g. Ostrom’s design principles, the Institutional 
Analysis and Development Framework) as guides for in-depth investigations of 
specific cases using a social constructivist approach (Wutich 2009; Cinner et al. 
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2012; Gruby and Basurto 2013; Afroz et al. 2016). This approach helped to struc-
ture some aspects of the analysis, without excluding other dimensions. Secondly, 
studies in institutional economics proposed adding concepts used in sociology 
and anthropology (e.g. power) to one of the IESD frameworks. Some articles 
made theoretical proposals (Epstein et al. 2014; Whaley and Weatherhead 2014). 
Others adopted the approach for a few cases, thus, deviating from the meta-anal-
ysis approach of the IESD school (Clement 2010). Few papers actually included 
concepts used in sociology and anthropology for a comparative analysis of sev-
eral cases (Cox et al. 2014). 
In fact, studies in sociology and anthropology have identified a broad set of 
elements, which they proved was important for understanding collective action in 
many of the examples that they studied in rural areas around the world. Integrating 
all these elements in one of the existing IESD frameworks appears to be an 
impossible task. Therefore, despite the fact that some interesting results have 
emerged from the study of specific cases, both IESD and sociology/anthropology 
approaches have failed to build a theoretical basis that: allows for a structured 
comparison between different cases; and at the same time provides a response 
to the criticisms made by sociologists and anthropologists regarding the IESD 
theoretical bases. 
The attempt to establish common ground between the two groups of theo-
ries has made little progress in the past 20 years. Therefore, a number of studies 
proposed drawing a line between the theoretical bases used by the two groups 
in terms of their goals, assumptions and methods (Mehta et al. 2001). Bardhan 
and Ray (2006) described the two groups of theories as being on opposite sides 
of several dichotomies, such as outcomes versus processes or autonomy versus 
embeddedness. Johnson (2004) went even further to argue that it is inevitable that 
the two groups of theories coexist separately, rather than find common ground. 
Over and above the conceptual issues, a further difficulty, which may limit the 
endeavors made by academics to establish common ground, is that the different 
academic communities using the two groups of theories conduct research on simi-
lar topics and sometimes compete for resources and influence. This can prevent 
in-depth discussion and cooperation (Geary 2010). Therefore, an issue of “collec-
tive action” clearly exists between academics from different research traditions.
4. An alternative way to frame a typology for studies of collective 
action
4.1. Validity scales 
Here, we propose an alternative way to find common ground between both groups 
of theories, which focuses on the validity scale used in studies. Researchers mobi-
lize theoretical bases and design methodologies to achieve a certain validity scale. 
It is important to note that the validity scale may differ from the level at which 
collective action is studied. Here, collective action is considered on a local level 
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(village, small to medium-scale irrigation scheme, etc.), whereas validity may be 
considered at local, meso or global level.
One group of studies of local collective action aims to achieve local validity, 
i.e. the level of the cases studied per se. Although global theoretical bases may be 
used in this type of approach, the methodology is generally defined on a case-by-
case basis. Methodologies can be defined on the basis of preliminary knowledge 
prior to data collection or built progressively during fieldwork as the researcher 
gains in-depth knowledge of the studied cases. This type of research gives prior-
ity to understanding the various multiple dimensions of collective action on a 
case-by-case basis, taking into account the fact that they may vary. This approach 
does not provide a framework for the structured comparison of different cases. 
Many studies in sociology and anthropology belong to this group (for instance, 
Fernández-Llamazares et al. 2016). 
Another group of studies of collective action uses theoretical bases and meth-
odologies designed to achieve global validity. They can be used for comparative 
analyses of a large set of different cases. The aim is to obtain findings that are 
considered valid for a large set of cases or even for any case of collective action. 
Most studies from the IESD school belong to this group (Agrawal 2001). 
In addition to these two well-known groups, a third group of studies focuses 
on a specific “sector” (e.g. a specific type of farmer organization in a given 
country, a specific problem of natural resource management in a region). This 
approach involves a structured comparative analysis of several cases within the 
sector. Studies of this kind are considered to have a meso-validity scale. They 
mobilize theoretical bases and design methodologies to take into account the key 
elements considered to influence the processes and outcomes of collective action 
in the region or sector under study. Some dimensions of the analysis may be given 
priority or excluded, depending on the context. For instance: power asymmetry 
between actors may be considerable in some regions and relatively limited in 
others; in a given region, informal, traditional coordination modes may be impor-
tant, while in other areas, formal institutions may provide the main framework 
for stakeholder interaction, etc. In order to understand water user associations 
in Pakistan, it is important to understand the roles played by powerful notables, 
as well as the informal relations that exist between farmers and the bureaucracy 
responsible for irrigation (Rinaudo 2002). By contrast, in the mountain areas of 
Morocco, in order to understand collective action for water management, it is 
important to grasp the link between the formal water user associations and tradi-
tional community-based management (Bekkari and del Castillo 2011). 
Figure 1 presents examples of research for all three validity scales. A key 
difference between approaches that use a meso-validity scale and those that use 
a local scale is that in the former, the dimensions of collective action, which are 
included in the theoretical basis, are drawn from more than one case. The selec-
tion of dimensions depends on the preliminary knowledge that researchers have 
of the whole set of cases (at sector or regional level). Indeed, researchers seek to 
apply the same theoretical basis to diverse cases within the sector or the region. 
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Meso-scale approaches also differ from studies using a global validity scale: 
in their theoretical basis, they include some elements that researchers consider 
important for examining the specific sector studied (e.g. collective action for for-
est management in a specific region).
Meso-scale analyses have been used to study collective action in diverse 
sectors, for instance agricultural cooperatives in India (Shah 1996), governance 
of groundwater in Morocco (Faysse et al. 2012) and Spain (Lopez-Gunn and 
Martinez-Cortina 2006), river committees in Tanzania (Komakech and Van der 
Zaag 2011), participatory irrigation management in Thailand (Ricks 2015) or for-
est governance in Cameroon (Ingram et al. 2015).2
Can analyses that use a meso-validity scale establish common ground between 
obtaining findings that can be scaled up (based on a structured comparison of case 
studies) and maintaining the complexity of collective action (as for individual 
case studies)? We propose three prerequisites to achieve common ground using 
a meso-validity scale approach. Analyses should: (i) take into account the most 
important elements and concepts for understanding the processes and outcomes 
of collective action in a specific region and/or sector; (ii) use a theoretical basis 
capable of addressing the criticisms made by sociologists and anthropologists 
2
 In this section, collective action was considered at the local level. Collective action between actors 
in rural areas may also involve actors on a wider regional or national level. In this case, a meso-scale 
analysis may involve the identification and characterization of actors’ networks for collective action, 
which deal with similar issues (for instance, resistance to dam building in South Asia).
Studied cases Validity of research 
Local validity scale 
Meso-validity scale 
Global validity scale 
One case of collective action for forest management
Cases of collective action for forest management in a specific region
Cases of collective action for forest management in one country 
Cases of collective action for water management in another country
Results valid with regard to
forest management in the
studied region 
Results valid with regard to
collective action designed to
address social dilemmas in
general 
Results valid for the case
studied 
Figure 1: Examples of research on collective action using different validity scales.
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with regard to IESD studies, as far as possible; and (iii) enable a structured com-
parative analysis of different cases of collective action, in terms of their processes 
and outcomes (and if the approach involves an assessment of the success of col-
lective action, it should focus on the diversity of possible viewpoints with regard 
to criteria for success). Not all analyses that use a meso-validity scale set out to 
meet these three conditions. Here, we present two examples that do so.
4.2. Two examples of analyses using a meso-validity scale
Shah (1995 and 1996) analyzed 100 cooperatives in India in order to understand 
the factors that determine their performance. Contrary to approaches in IESD, 
Shah did not use his own definition of the performance of collective action. 
He considered that cooperatives were performing if their members thought so. 
Shah (1995) conducted a quantitative comparison of the cooperatives, based on 
a specifically designed framework. He suggested that cooperative performance 
is influenced by a set of factors. These factors may be internal or external to the 
cooperatives, for example, support from federations of cooperatives and the state. 
Moreover, Shah explicitly took into account the challenges faced by cooperatives 
in terms of meeting the demands of members with different interests and goals 
(and hence a different appreciation of their cooperative’s performance).
Shah (1995) found that the most influential factor for the success of coopera-
tives (according to the members’ assessment) is the members’ capacity to pres-
surize the management committee in order to achieve their own objectives. Shah 
(1996) conducted a qualitative assessment of the same cooperatives. For each 
type of cooperative in a specific region (e.g. dairy cooperatives in Gujarat), he 
analyzed the past dynamics, taking into account issues such as the relationship 
between the cooperative and the state, the role of power relations and local poli-
tics, the cast system, etc. Based on this analysis, Shah (1996) identified a series 
of design principles, that are of key importance when it comes to explaining the 
capacity of cooperatives to meet their members’ expectations. Shah also showed 
that successful cooperatives often diversify their activities in order to play a prom-
inent role in their members’ daily lives. By doing so, they mobilize their mem-
bers. Successful cooperatives are often founded by the members and continuously 
adapt their modus operandi in order to cope with risk or size opportunities.
Shah reaches some of the same conclusions as Ostrom (1990): (i) cooperative 
members should be free to design and experiment rules for managing their coop-
eratives; (ii) the state may intervene to support local collective action, but only on 
the condition that it does not interfere in cooperative governance. However, some 
of Shah’s results differ from Ostrom’s. According to Shah, the key to success-
ful collective action is not so much a specific set of principles for framing rules, 
but rather the institutional design, i.e. the general relationship between actors, 
as well as the rules that encourage actors to behave in a way that will benefit the 
whole group. There is no ideal institutional design for agricultural cooperatives. 
However, in many sectors (e.g. borehole companies in Gujarat), designs that are 
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conducive to successful collective action have emerged after a lengthy process of 
trial and error. They are well-adapted to the constraints and opportunities specific 
to each sector. These sector-specific institutional designs are a particularly clear 
example of results obtained with a meso-scale approach.
Ben Mustapha (2016) conducted an analysis of three small-scale irrigation 
schemes in Tunisia. This work builds on actor-oriented approach (Long 2003). 
The actors studied were mainly farmers, members of the water user association’s 
management committee, the staff of the water user association and the civil ser-
vants in the administration responsible for monitoring the water user associations. 
In each case, she identified the main issues that stimulated coordination and nego-
tiation among actors. 
For each issue, she used the same conceptual framework to assess: actors’ 
rationale (the meaning they gave to their actions on the basis of their understand-
ing of the system and the situation), their objectives and strategy, their agency 
(ability to act individually and/or collectively to achieve their goals), the out-
comes of their actions and what they learned from their experience. In particular, 
she studied the extent to which actors acted alone or sought to build coalitions 
to reach their objectives. The collective actions between actors were positioned 
along a gradient, which included the following cases: (i) the actors do not share 
a common diagnosis of the issue; (ii) some actors have a common diagnosis, but 
fail to identify a solution that each of them considers relevant (according to his or 
her own individual objectives); (iii) some actors have identified a solution, but are 
unable to implement it; and (iv) some actors form an active coalition to resolve 
the issue.
Ben Mustapha (2016) showed that, within the same water user association, the 
types of coalitions between actors differed significantly from one issue to another. 
This applies both to the actors involved and to their position on the gradient. The 
analysis helped identify the stumbling blocks preventing improved levels of coor-
dination between actors. It also helped identify the differences between actors in 
terms of their perception of the water user association’s main objective and its 
performance. For instance, in one case, farmers considered that the association’s 
main goal was to meet the members’ needs. However, the civil servants in the 
administration in charge of monitoring water user associations considered that the 
association’s main goal was to ensure that the irrigation infrastructure was used 
sustainably (see also Ben Mustapha et al. 2015).
The conceptual frameworks used by Shah (1995 and 1996) and Ben Mustapha 
(2016) both aim to achieve a meso-validity scale. They include certain elements 
that may be considered generic (e.g. the typology of collective actions developed 
in the study by Ben Mustapha 2016). However, both researchers chose framework 
designs that were specifically suited to assess collective action, respectively, in 
cooperatives in India and in water user associations in Tunisia. The preliminary 
knowledge they gained from the cases studied meant they were able to select the 
important elements to include in their frameworks. Elements of minor importance 
were excluded. Thus, their frameworks did not aim to have a global validity scale. 
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For instance, Shah (1995) considered that the ethnic composition within coop-
eratives was important because it is an important issue in India. By contrast, Ben 
Mustapha (2016) did not study ethnic composition because rural inhabitants in 
central and northern parts of Tunisia are quite homogeneous in terms of ethnic 
origin. Ben Mustapha chose not to assess the influence of religious beliefs or tra-
ditional forms of solidarity on the actors’ approach to cooperation and negotiation 
in the irrigation schemes studied. Ben Mustapha and Shah considered farming 
households as a whole and did not investigate relations within each household. 
Table 1 shows how the theoretical bases adopted by Shah (1995 and 1996) and 
Ben Mustapha (2016) addressed the five main criticisms made by the sociologists 
and anthropologists with regard to the IESD school of thought. In particular, both 
studies used a social constructivist approach to collective action and performance. 
They took into account the fact that actors have different objectives, expectations, 
as well as different definitions of the performance of collective action. In addition, 
their conceptual frameworks do not focus on resolving a single social dilemma. 
These two cases also show that diverse theoretical bases may use a meso-
validity scale. Shah (1995, 1996) was anchored in institutional economics and 
established causal linkages between explanatory variables and the performance 
of cooperatives (as the explained variable). Ben Mustapha (2016) was anchored 
in sociology and did not attempt to make these links. Instead, she focused on 
the processes of interaction between actors. Moreover, Shah’s assessment of 100 
cooperatives across India is situated at a higher level than Ben Mustapha’s study 
(2016) of three irrigation schemes in northern and central Tunisia. Concomitantly, 
Table 1: How the theoretical bases used by Shah (1995 and 1996) and Ben Mustapha (2016) 
address the criticisms of sociologists and anthropologists with regard to the IESD school of 
thought.
 Shah  Ben Mustapha
Multiple issues and social 
embeddedness
 The qualitative component of the 
analysis takes into account multiple 
issues and social embeddedness
 The interactions between 
actors were studied with 
regard to several issues
Multiple values, objectives and 
definitions of performance
 A social constructivist approach of 
performance
 A social constructivist 
approach of performance
External actors and factors  The study takes into account 
supporting institutions and 
economic context 
 The influence of major actors 
external to the irrigation 
scheme is taken into account
Power relationships  Power relationships are taken 
into account in the qualitative 
component of the study
 There is an assessment of 
how actors attempt to impose 
their viewpoints, alone or in 
coalitions
History and processes  This component is considered in the 
qualitative component of the study
 The study involved an 
assessment of the evolution 
of the relations between 
actors over a 4-year period
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Shah’s assessment of cases of collective action was much less detailed than that 
undertaken by Ben Mustapha.
4.3. Validity scales and policy recommendations
Each validity scale makes it possible to obtain findings that are specific in terms 
of providing a basis for suggesting initiatives or policies to support actors’ collec-
tive action. Studies that use a local validity scale enable a detailed understanding 
of specific cases that, by design, cannot be generalized. Some use this detailed 
understanding to propose initiatives that could support collective action in the 
specific case studies (taking into account the possible diversity with regard to how 
actors define an improvement in collective action). By contrast, studies that use 
a global validity scale produce numerous generic findings, which are based on a 
less detailed understanding of specific cases. Studies based on a global validity 
scale may propose very broad recommendations, such as the relevance of users’ 
involvement in decision-making for managing irrigation schemes.
Studies using a meso-validity scale can provide a useful contribution to the 
design of initiatives or public policies that aim to support a specific sector (e.g. 
forest management in a given country). They have developed theoretical bases 
that do not oversimplify the complexity of the case studies. They also involve 
a structured comparative approach that makes it possible to scale up research 
results. Indeed, many studies that use a meso-validity scale have made proposals 
for the kind of policies that could support the inception and performance of col-
lective action (Shah 1996; Lopez-Gunn and Martinez-Cortina 2006; Faysse et al. 
2012; Ingram et al. 2015; Ricks 2015).
4.4. Innovative research questions
Analyses of collective action in rural areas involving a meso-validity scale have 
been successfully conducted for many years. However, they have sometimes been 
considered as mere building blocks for theories of collective action that set out 
to achieve global validity. Consequently, the theoretical bases and methodologies 
used have often been disregarded. In order to grasp the importance of analyses 
that use a meso-validity scale, we need to study how their theoretical bases are 
designed and applied. 
Several possible areas of research could be explored to reconsider the numer-
ous meso analyses that have been conducted and to undertake new analyses. 
One area of research could examine the design of theoretical bases and method-
ologies for local collective action, which use a meso-validity scale. This could 
involve an assessment of how a preliminary informal exploratory analysis (litera-
ture review, contacts with local actors, etc.) is undertaken in order to identify the 
most important concepts to include in the theoretical basis. This requires a much 
clearer understanding of what “a concept important for the analysis of collective 
action” actually means. A second area of research could focus on the contents 
of the theoretical bases and the methodologies: which concepts are selected and 
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why; how theoretical bases at meso scale can address the criticisms made by soci-
ologists and anthropologists; how the sampling of case studies is organized; and 
how the validity of research results is constructed at regional or sectorial level. 
A third area of research could aim to further our understanding of the link-
ages between the three types of studies (in terms of the validity scales) and, in 
particular, how the findings at one level can provide a research framework at 
another level. Earlier, we mentioned the use of IESD frameworks in some socio-
logical and anthropological studies. Studies with a local validity scale (involving 
long periods spent with the communities, participant observation, open interviews 
with key informants, focus groups, etc.) are useful for gaining a comprehensive 
understanding of specific cases, which can then provide the basis for designing 
meso-validity analyses.
5. Conclusion
When studying collective action in rural areas linked to common-pool resource 
management and agricultural production, researchers have drawn from diverse 
theoretical bases. Over the past 20 years, while the two main groups of theories 
have influenced each other, dialogue between the two has been virtually non-exis-
tent. The rare exchanges have failed to establish common ground, i.e. approaches 
that both groups consider to be valid. The main aim of most exchanges has been 
to identify theoretical bases in relation to two criteria, namely, that the theories 
should produce universal assertions that can be applied to collective action, as 
well as a response to the main criticisms expressed by sociologists and anthro-
pologists with regard to the IESD school. 
The focus on validity scales reveals why attempts to find common ground 
between the two groups have failed. Implicitly or explicitly, IESD approaches 
were always thought to have a global validity scale. On the contrary, approaches 
used in sociology and anthropology were thought to involve at least part of 
their research approach that was based on a local validity scale. Thus, establish-
ing common ground meant constructing theoretical bases, which had a univer-
sal application, as well as the capacity to cater for all the possible dimensions 
of collective action to be found in any local case study. This was simply not 
possible.
The emphasis on validity scales is also helpful when it comes to identifying 
a way forward. Finding common ground may be possible if each group accepts 
the idea of “stretching” the scale used in their research: (i) instead of setting out 
to obtain universal findings, the goal could be shifted to focus on results that are 
valid in a specific region or sector; (ii) instead of trying to include a large number 
of key elements to analyze collective action on a case-by-case basis, only the 
most important elements for assessing collective action in a specific region or 
sector could be selected. We have shown that the meso-validity scale can be used 
to obtain findings, which can then be scaled up from specific cases, without over-
simplifying local realities.
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Meso-scale analyses can help renew dialogue between both groups. Firstly, 
discussion could focus on the methods used for meso-scale analyses (see the 
research questions suggested above). Secondly, there may be an opportunity to set 
up research with both groups (IESD and sociology/anthropology), which could 
study a common set of cases of collective action using a meso-validity scale. 
These studies should meet the three prerequisites mentioned above for establish-
ing common ground, namely: taking into account the most important elements 
for understanding collective action in local cases in the same region or sector; 
addressing the criticisms expressed by sociologists and anthropologists with 
regard to the IESD approaches; organizing a structured comparison of cases. If 
both research studies shared some common ground in this way, dialogue between 
scholars from the two groups would be more fruitful, particularly because the 
results from one study could be used to develop the findings from the other. Thus, 
both groups’ research could contribute to a more profound and multidimensional 
understanding of actors’ collective action in rural areas.
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